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DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM.

Two modes of criticism have been developed in the history of judgment which may be designated by the terms "aristocratic" and "democratic," on the ground that as the art of an aristocracy is the product of an exclusive culture, the object of the accompanying criticism is to develop and discipline "good taste," and as the art of a democracy is an outcome of generous human impulses, the aim of its criticism is to increase and fortify personality.

In a "classic" age, the ideal of which is to have and be the "best," the fine arts are patronized and enjoyed in the interests of an intellectual and special culture. The reader of books, reclining at ease in his library chair, assumes the judicial attitude and essays to find that in the book which accords with "good taste" and "right reason." He concerns himself largely with questions of taste, matters of style, and principles of correct composition. A Matthew Arnold selects a line from Dante and one from Chaucer and uses them as touchstones of propriety. The æsthetic canons that support this criticism relate to principles of refinement, selection, symmetry, balance and proportion, the general effects, that is, involved in the standard classical canon of order in variety.

The classical canon was a rule of temperance. The Greeks lived resolutely in the whole, loving equally truth and beauty and goodness, proportioning the play of each faculty so as to secure the largest total effect of life. With the authority of their matchless achievements they imposed upon all succeeding art and criticism an æsthetics corresponding to their ethics.

But the classical ideal of perfection, as it has received application in the modern world, is an ethics of restriction. Intellectualism dominates the process. To-day to be cultured in the classical sense means to be intellectually refined and polished and to have the impulses of the heart well un-

der the control of the head. To be socially aristocratic means to seek the attainment that only the few can achieve and to abhor the coarseness and vulgarity that attach to the general mass. So to be critically aristocratic is to love the good form and grand manner that spring from a prerogative culture and to detest the imperfections that belong to universal and humanistic art.

The first great force that affected æsthetics to the opposition of the exclusory canon of culture was Christianity. Christ directed the sight of the world away from the external to the truth of the inner life. The beauty of his religion is the beauty of holiness. The contest between the two principles of beauty is well illustrated in "Quo Vadis," by Henryk Sienkiewicz, which may be read as an allegory of the struggle between sense and soul in the transition period from paganism to Christianity. Greek poetry and beauty passed with the death of Petronius and Eunice, but a higher poetry and beauty was born at the marriage of Vinicius and Lygia. "Whoso loves beauty is unable to love deformity" said Petronius, the arbiter of elegance. But in the mind of Vinicius was generated the idea that another beauty resided in the world, a beauty immensely pure, even though deformed, in which a soul abides.

The next considerable force that tended to modify the classical standards was science. Instead of the cultured man, science rewards the knowing man; and instead of the art of "good form," it advocates an art of true fact. In one sense science is an apotheosis of the commonplace. It exalts comprehensiveness. From its microscope, piercing inward to the atom, and from its telescope, pointing outward to the star, nothing is excluded that is inclusive. The love of pure truth which science has engendered, and the truer view of the constitution of things which knowledge has brought, has had a profound effect upon both artistic production and criticism. The first great result of science was the dispossession of the field of art of its conventional themes and the substitution of realities in their stead. Painting and literature, the representative arts, have been the arts

especially affected. The weary round of madonnas and saints that the Church required of its pietistic painters gave way before the awakened enthusiasm of men for the common sights of the town and woodland—"the shapes of things, their colors, lights, and shades, changes, surprises."

Fra Filippo Lippi was in too early revolt against the religious theme to establish a method, but still in his ideas he was a precursor of scientific landscape art. Browning in his poem on this artist makes the painter monk say to his captors, the constables of Florence:

Do you feel thankful, ay or no,
For this fair town's face, yonder river's line,
The mountain round it and the sky above,
Much more the figures of man, woman, child,
These are the frame to? What's it all about?
To be passed over, despised? or dwelt upon,
Wondered at?

If science had not then come in to answer this question "What's it all about?" and to construct a new and vital mythology of nature, we might still be admiring St. Lawrence toasting on the irons, or Jerome beating with a stone his poor old breast.

In literature science has rendered nugatory for modern service the whole body of imaginative myths and fictions. "Geology," says Professor Chamberlain, "has dispossessed Hades. A great field of gloomy imagery is gone. Dante's 'Inferno' is a literary phenomenon that will never recur. On the earth the whole category of ghosts and witches, of demons and dragons, of elves and fairies are gone, and the literary function they subserved is destroyed. The 'Hamlet' of the future may have its Hamlet, but not its ghost. Astronomy has swept away the mythic heavens and destroyed still richer and brighter fields of imagery. Aurora and Phœbus and the crystalline sphere are gone. The curtain of the heavens has been folded up and laid away as the garments of our children, as things loved but outgrown. Olympus is gone. Milton's cosmos, equally with his chaos, is only a picture of the past. The richest imagery of all past literature has lost its power save as the glory of the

past. And this simply because it was not true." Truth is indeed the key word of science. To this everything is sacrificed. But while old things have passed away, a new literary heaven and earth are being created, and upon the new materials imagination proposes to work with the old potency and charm and idealization. Whitman speaks the word of the modern in his declaration that "the true use for imaginative faculty of modern times is to give ultimate vivification to facts, to science, and to common lives, endowing them with the glories and final illustriousness which belong to every real thing and to real things only. Without that ultimate vivification which the poet or other artist alone can give, reality would seem incomplete, and science, democracy, and life itself finally in vain." If facts are to be made into art, the one factor necessary is the sufficient artist to harvest, grind, knead, and bake the facts. After the success of Emerson, Tennyson, Browning, and Whitman in handling scientific material there need be no fear of default in imaginative creation in art. It may be that the actual knowledge we shall gain of the visible universe will make the fictions of fancy comparatively petty and jejune. How sublime are the heavens to Whitman! Can fancy exceed this simple statement:

I open my scuttle at night and see the far-sprinkled systems;
And all I see, multiplied as high as I can cipher, edge but the rim
 of the farther systems.
Wider and wider they spread, expanding, always expanding,
Outward and outward and forever outward.
My sun has his sun, and round him obediently wheels;
He joins with his partners a group of superior circuit;
And greater sets follow, making specks of the greatest inside them.
See ever so far, there is limitless space outside of that,
Count ever so much, there is limitless time around that.

With this introduction of scientific fact into the productive field, the intrusion of the scientific spirit in the realm of criticism could hardly be avoided. Something was needed to recover criticism from its "primrose path of dalliance" and to give it serious content. For the criticism of taste, during the period of declining aristocracy, had become mere dilet-

tantism, mere tasting and relishing and objecting; in the words of Professor Freeman "mere chatter about Shelley," or in the phrase of a still severer castigator of cultured methods, Professor Gildersleeve, "mere sensibility and opulent phraseology," "finical fault-finding," or "sympathetic phrasemongery." In the face of such incompetency science, with its inductive method, its conception of law, had no difficulty in bringing the artistic world to a new point of view. The general effect of scientific methods and ideas upon æsthetics has been to advance the spirit of disinterestedness, to adopt relative for absolute standards, to emphasize matter instead of manner, and to introduce notions of life and growth. "Before all else," says Professor Dowden, an exponent of scientific interpretation, "the effort of criticism in our time has been to see things as they are, without partiality, without obtrusion of personal liking or disliking, without the impertinence of blame or applause." Perhaps of greater significance has been the recognition of law which has lifted the study of art out of the dominion of elegant trifling and allied it to the important sciences of life and mind. Specifically, three schools of study have arisen under the domination of the scientific spirit: first, the investigators who undertake the "higher criticism" of texts and deal narrowly with questions of fact; second, the inductive interpreters who work broadly with the factors of age, race, and environment, evolution and personal force, or who scrutinize specific compositions to determine the principles of interpretation; third, the "comparative" group, who conceive literature as one of the provinces of universal nature, whose aim is to compare literatures, to study origins, the development and diffusion of literary themes and forms, to group the whole body of literary facts according to natural lines of evolution, and to write the history of man in so far as that history is reflected in his imaginative creations.

Contemporary with the seething intellectual movement which brought science to birth, a mightier and more extensive social revolution created the second of the modern Titans, democracy. Democracy, operating both as a destruc-

tive and a constructive force, was destined from the first effectually to destroy the monarchic and feudal position, to modify or supplement the ideas and methods of science, and to start the critical world toward a new point of view.

The general significance of the democratic movement in art is well expressed by Edward Carpenter in his poem "Towards Democracy:"

Art can no longer be separated from life;

The old canons fail; her tutelage completed, *she becomes equivalent to Nature*, and hangs her curtains continuous with the clouds and waterfalls.

The form of man emerges in all objects, baffling the old classifications and definitions. . . .

The old ties giving way beneath the strain, and the great pent heart heaving as though it would break—

At the sound of the new word spoken,
At the sound of the word "democracy."

Wholly indifferent to the outcry of a privileged culture, democracy has brought about an extension of the bounds of art in three directions. In another paper I have spoken of the inclosure in the field of art, through the growth of the modern spirit, of the average and the universal man. Democratic art has taken for its set purpose to unfold the beauties inherent in the people and to declare the glory of the daily walk and trade. Two features of the movement which have bearing upon the theory of art remain to be considered. First, the distinction drawn by aristocratic culture between the fine arts and the industrial arts, is losing its force. The removal of boundary lines does not point to the abasement and vulgarization of the fine arts, but signifies rather a radical and violent reversal in æsthetic theory. The grounds of art are shifting from outward formalism to some principle relating to subjective play and life. The artist is the maker, the free creator, who molds materials of many kinds to the end of pleasure and self-realization. When the industrial artist works under the conditions of freedom and self-realization, he ceases to be a slave to commerce and production, is entitled to the name of the fine artist as well as to his rewards in joyous existence—the rewards that the divine artist

gets, in his own creations. Not a perfect object but a perfected man, not a rigid definition but a fluid personality, is the end of socialistic art.

The one mind that has penetrated the waste bewilderment of the industrial world, understood its tendencies, and solved the problem of its emancipation, is William Morris, whose career as poet, master workman and socialist has been determined by his conversion and subsequent adherence to the cause of democratic art. Morris' great life work has not been his poems but his theory of life. The redemption of the toiling masses of men from themselves, their environment and their actual oppressors, by a life expanding toward an ideal beauty to be realized in every activity from the lowest to the highest—this has been the end for which the poet labored. His desire to return art (by which he meant the pleasure of life) to the people explains his abandonment of his early lyrics and epics, his espousal of socialism as a means of redemption, and his industrial experiments in proof of the easy alliance of beauty and life.

The propositions of industrial æsthetics may be briefly formulated in the following terms: first, beauty and art are no mere accidents of human life, which people can take or leave as they choose, but a positive necessity of concrete living—unless men are content to exist in a manner less than the highest. Second, beauty is a subjective effect and to be defined in terms of pleasure. And the highest pleasure is that which arises when an artist is given permission to set forth freely in forms that which his mind conceives. "That thing," said Morris, "which I understand by real art is the expression by man of his pleasure in labor." Third, granting the pleasure of life to be the essence of beauty, how can beauty be universally realized? How but by the association of beauty and that which is commonest and nearest, the labor of the human hand? Labor is not rightly a preparation for living but a consecrated means of living. Labor becomes life when it is in the direction of a man's will. Structure should arise out of the soul. Decoration is the expression of man's pleasure in work, the play of the hand

in free activity. The pleasure that the fine artist enjoys returns to the people when the people in their turn learn to express themselves in their daily work with the artist's freedom and to the end of self-realization. Then are art and labor associated to the consecration of each, and modern industrialism emancipated from its slavish subjection to a machine and a product. The popularization of art involves the two factors, the return of creation to that which man must perforce make and the return of pleasure to that which man must perforce use.

The association of art and labor is no new experience in the race's history. The life of the people of Japan furnishes a convenient illustration of the power of beauty to enhance the pleasure of living. Among the Japanese the love of art is innate, its production universal. Labor of every kind, even to the tilling of a tiny plot of ground or the building of their modest homes, is done as much to give delight in contemplation as to supply the gross needs of daily existence. The common articles of use bear the impress of artistic fingers. They are made to strike the senses by their beauty as the first effect of their use. Care is taken to build the home that it may command an ample view of the country side. The charm of their towns lies in their location and in the design of street and garden and grove. The people of Japan have no rest day, no Sunday or saints' days—what need have they to escape from toil when labor is itself a blessing? Living for beauty is life in the direction of complete satisfaction. They are not in bondage as Western nations are to any system of superfluous wants. Nature is made subservient to their æsthetic impulses. Their appropriation of the world is not mechanical but personal. When a tree blossoms and flowers bloom an ecstasy is felt by the farmer, not at the prospective crop but at the immediate spectacle. A bird is held in regard for its song and plumage. A mountain is the symbol of the celestial paradise. They have exorcised the demon of hurry. They live for their ideals, working with loving care upon *minutiæ* which seem to the Western mind incompatible with the serious

business of life, the making fame, wealth, leisure luxury. The result is that the poorest endure an otherwise burdensome lot with equanimity because of the satisfaction beauty affords the finest instincts. As a race the Japanese, in the land of flowers, are simple in their modes of life, quick in intelligence, gentle in character, elastic in temperament, juvenescent in feeling—a race kept ever young by their love of beauty.

Among European peoples there was a time in the Middle Ages when art and labor had their due association. That was the short, brilliant period when labor, having won its freedom, expended its energies in the erection of the Gothic cathedrals. “In the twelfth century,” said William Morris, recounting the struggle for freedom, “the actual handicraftsmen found themselves at last face to face with the development of the earlier associations of freemen which were the survivals from the tribal society of Europe; in the teeth of these exclusive and aristocratic municipalities the handicraftsmen had associated themselves into guilds of craft, and were claiming their freedom from legal and arbitrary oppression and a share in the government of the towns; by the end of the thirteenth century they had conquered the position everywhere, and within the next fifty or sixty years the governors of the free towns were the delegates of the craft guilds and all handicraft was included in their associations. This period of their triumph, marked amid other events by the battle of Courtrai, where the chivalry of France turned their backs in flight before the Flemish weavers, was the period during which Gothic architecture reached its zenith.” The glory of Gothic architecture lies in the association of art and labor in construction: labor was free, and free labor issued in glorious art.

In like manner the struggle of the modern world to gain its industrial independence is leading directly toward artistic constructiveness. Every gain in freedom means a step forward in art. The issue of the industrial battle is perhaps the greatest in history. For in it are wrapped up the possibilities of a universal art. It is not possible that the inter-

ests of men can be for very long confined to the development of the mechanical energies alone.

The principles of industrial æsthetics, and conspicuously the canon of the pleasure of life, are fortified and proved by the result of scientific investigation into the origin of the artistic impulse. Evolutionary æsthetics points to a conception of art as the outcome and embodiment of the freer and higher activities of being. By means of the principle of play, first suggested by Schiller, but for which in this connection the name of Herbert Spencer stands, the origin of art in primitive man is intelligibly explained. Briefly stated, the knowledge prevails that art has its origin when the race had reached that stage of culture that it could rise above mere physical necessity and gratify the instincts and feelings just dawning into consciousness by engaging in free "play." Play as a form of more or less spontaneous expression, implies freedom from physical needs, an excess of life functioning, some conscious satisfaction, and a certain power of abstraction. When play came to be consciously regulated under some principle of order, and conducted to the satisfaction of higher instincts and the conveyance of the sense of spiritual significance in material things, the long process of art began.

Evolutionary æsthetics agrees with the propositions of industrial æsthetics in regard to the primal principle of the importance of beauty in life. In play primitive man, engaging in an ideal exercise, brought into activity, and therefore into fuller consciousness, the various ideal faculties of his being. It would seem that art, considered in its aspect of play, is the goal of all life. As Schiller says, man "only plays when in the full meaning of the term he is man, and he is only completely man when he plays." Evolutionary advance is along the line of the selection and survival of beauty. The agreement of the theories is even closer in respect of the universality of the artistic instinct and the corresponding need of every human being to become a free creator if he is to live the life designed by nature and advance himself into higher forms of spiritual godlikeness. The play of evolutionary

æsthetics is the pleasure of industrial æsthetics, and play and pleasure are just so much of spiritual significance added to life and labor. A third aspect of the general question appears in what may be called educational æsthetics, meaning by this the theory of beauty that concurs with the principles and methods of the new education. The new education differs from the old in regard to purpose and means. The education of the past has been in a great measure special and aristocratic. The feudal system evolved a curriculum directed to the shaping of a gentleman, a dignified and exalted object, and the gentleman in his turn took care to preserve his position by insuring general ignorance on the side of the masses and a special culture for himself and fellows. The means employed was an exclusive school with its classical studies and its formal discipline. Though social conditions changed from century to century, and the world at large grew slowly democratic, the school remained a stronghold of the nobility and retained its feudal forms and traditions. Almost to the present day the school has educated its pupils intellectually and prepared them to live in an aristocracy. It has left them selfish and destroyed sympathy and the spirit of good will. So far as this education was æsthetic it followed the classical canon of culture, the canon of selection and refinement. To strive for selection and refinement in an age of humanity, to separate men from each other when the conditions of social happiness require association, is to leave life bare and barren. An education formed on the lines and principles of a Greek temple is too narrow, perfect, and exclusive to meet the wants of an era of expansion. Mutterings of discontent have recently been heard from some who recognize the failure of the dogma of discipline and who have visions of the future of good will. A prominent educator, Mr. Hezekiah Butterworth, has recently voiced this feeling of dissatisfaction: "Our schools have followed too largely the monarchical idea, and too little the plan of self-government, which represents the spirit of the Republic. We look out on the moral conditions of the people with alarm, and there

comes to the prophetic souls the strong conviction that we must have a new order of universal education—an education that tends to character on the principle that ‘power lies in the ultimates’—to make a new generation to meet the higher demands of the age.” The age demands character, not merely knowledge or discipline. It demands a full-rounded personality, capable of responding to the myriad appeals of environment, equipped for sensation, feeling, thought, and conduct. It demands an education that shall be social in its forms and altruistic in its motives. The failure of the present modes is further enforced by Mr. Butterworth: “Our present system of elementary education does not rise to the moral requirements of the age; it stands too largely for the development of memory for the purpose of mere money-making, to the neglect of the nobler spiritual faculties. It too often leaves out the cultivation of the heart and the training of the hand, the quickening of conscience and the growth of the moral perception. Such a system is not education in any large sense; it is what Pestalozzi called ‘mere instruction.’ The education that makes character, individual and national, begins with the heart, the conscience, and the imagination.” Another censure of like import has been rendered by Josephine Locke: “Our education has been too mathematical and too analytic; it has trained the individual for self-preservation at the expense of his relationship to his fellows. It has blinded him to coöperation with the great law of evolution: vicarious suffering, self-sacrifice. How has it done this? By presenting the studies isolatedly for their own sakes, and by teaching each subject in its immediate details, in its Gradgrind facts, by the omission of the æsthetic element, by the exaltation of culture for culture’s sake, by the offering of stimulants to excellence and by giving the disciplinary and formal studies precedence over the nourishing and informal.” There is need, therefore, in modern culture of securing some effective means of cherishing the ideal within the soul. We need a new standard of values. The educational reforms in contemplation provide for the application of the

principle of self-activity in all lines of development. This involves the substitution of character for knowledge, an inward striving for an outward accomplishment, an experience for a derivation, the exercise of the whole social personality for mere intellectual display. As means to secure the spiritualization of education the advocates of the new theory offer creative or artistic studies in the place of formal or disciplinary ones. The child learns by creating. The power by which educational activity is carried on is imagination. This is the central faculty upon the development of which depends the efficiency of the faculties of observation and judgment, the exercise of the reason, the activity of the will, and the responsiveness of the moral sympathies. The studies calculated to discipline and nourish the imagination are the arts. Art is liberation. It is instinct, feeling, spontaneity. It is the full activity of the self. Good will lies at the heart. Its characteristics are freedom, self-activity, and love.

Whether the ideal of the new education can be realized remains to be seen. Surely the child, modeling a form in the pliant clay, affords a happier and more hopeful sight than the child learning by rote a printed page. As the new movement is the outcome of democracy, we may expect its advance with the increase of the democratic spirit. The æsthetical principle involved is the same as that presented by science and the new industrialism, the principle of play. May it not be that through the operation of evolution, the struggles of industrialism to secure the freedom of the workers, and the efforts of the school to reach the hearts and souls of its pupils a new æsthetic man will rise to grace the later ages of the world?

Besides establishing the canon of pleasure for the creative artist, democracy has given formulation to a second though allied principle of æsthetics for the use of the critic: the canon of correspondency or the canon of the characteristic. With the development of the modern spirit questions respecting the nature of beauty have again arisen. Does beauty lie in the right relation of the parts of a composition

or in inherency and wholes? Is it something artificial and conventional, or something attached to vital functioning? Is it conserved by obedience to the aristocratic canon of order, or to the democratic canon of the characteristic? "My opinion," said Walt Whitman, "has long been that for New World service our ideas of beauty need to be radically changed and made anew for to-day's purposes and finer standards." Sooner or later the New World, for purposes of its own, will construct a complete system of æsthetics from the point of view of character or inherency. The feeling for beauty may be said, indeed, to be as wide as life itself. Some stages of this expansion of interest may be seen in the never-ending revolt against the restrictions imposed by the classical canon of order, with the result of inaugurating at certain times vast and far-reaching revolutionary movements in the direction of the romantic. Theoretical stages of this change are discoverable in the growth of the term "beauty" in point of its inclusiveness. Up to the eighteenth century the term referred almost exclusively to that which was appropriately designed and ordered. But nature exhibited aspects harsh and terrible and uncouth, which nevertheless had interest to men. To explain human sympathy with that which was not well ordered, the theory of the sublime was developed, at first without relation to the theory of beauty, but later falling within its scope. At the same time the theory of the ugly was broached, the ugly being regarded as the negative of the beautiful. But recent æsthetics understands that the ugly, by becoming characteristic, may be made a subordinate element in the effects of beauty, and so the theory is absorbed in the larger conception.

From a wider historical and philosophical point of view the stages of advance may be indicated by reference to the development of an important principle of thought. The Greeks were held at the stage of naturalistic monism, and, finding unity in external nature and in form, the æsthetic canon of order in variety sufficed the needs of their philosophy. The Middle Ages, under the influence of Christianity, advanced to the stage of romantic dualism, a vast gulf being

fixed between an infinite ideal of perfection and any possible attainment in a finite world. The philosophy so deepened its knowledge with respect to the universe within that the mind learned to rely upon a symbol for the expression of its thought, without regard to the formal quality of the means. Thus far no adequate synthesis had been reached. The Greeks found unity in nature through defective idealism. The Middle Ages arrived at unity in the infinite through an imperfect sense of the finite. The last and modern stage of spiritual monism represents on the one hand the closure of the gulf between form and content, under the combined forces of idealistic philosophy and monistic science, which together reveal the immanent reason in both the world without and the world within, and on the other hand the attainment of a new synthesis of ideal in form. A form idealized has the unity neither in the form nor in the idea, but in an idealized form that is different from either form or idea; it is form made abstract; it is idea made concrete. The racial expression of this philosophic synthesis is discoverable in the growing sense of the solidarity of society which is manifestly increasing through the extension of individual importance. The artistic outcome of the process is an art that does not aim primarily at a beautiful form, but at the most adequate expression of some particular content. The corresponding critical theory is one that scrutinizes form for its meaning and idea for adequate expression. Philosophic monism, social democracy, characteristic art, and the corresponding æsthetics are parts of one stupendous social movement.

According to the canon of the characteristic, beauty lies in significance. Beauty comes into being when a significant content is duly expressed. "Which is the more beautiful," asked Millet, "a straight tree or a crooked tree?" And he answered forthwith: "Whichever is the most in place. The beautiful is that which is in place." This describes the music of Wagner, and of other romantic composers; the beauty of whose music does not rest in tone or in relation of tone, but in the adequacy of expression to meaning. The form is beautiful in so far as it has been absorbed in mind and feel-

ing. As the middle term between form and content is the artist who gives the idea to the form, as no content can get into a form without first being in the man, art has come to be defined as "the utterance of all that life contains." But life must be sincere. Beauty abides in creation on the artist's part, in re-creation on the observer's part. The admission of the personal element carries with it the justification of artistic egotism and even lawlessness; the real law, however, is not outer but inner. The ugly takes a place in the synthesis if it can be flushed with meaning. The grotesque gargoyles of a Gothic cathedral are directly related to the creed which the cathedral exhibits; they have the same right there as the figures of angels. The way is opened for the play of suggestions and associations. Formal art is displayed to the senses and to the logical intellect; characteristic art quickens the imagination and throws the observer back upon his own power to deal artistically with realities. It has multiple standards, inasmuch as the possible relations between form and idea are infinite. One perfection in art does not destroy any other perfection any more than one eyesight countervails another eyesight. The classical standards are not destroyed, provided the idea is of such a nature as to require the abstraction of form for its presentation. Further, characteristic art is often indeterminate in value. It is beautiful to one who can make it so. More than ordinary demands are made, therefore, upon the critic who would realize the unity of art that depends upon meaning. Schlegel makes this clear in discussing the higher unity of a play: "The separate parts of a work of art are all subservient to one common aim—namely, to produce a joint impression on the mind. Here, therefore, the unity lies in a single sphere, in the feeling or in the reference to ideas. This is all one, for the feeling as far as it is not merely sensual and passive, is our sense or organ for the Infinite which forms itself into ideas for us. Far, therefore, from rejecting the law of a perfect unity in tragedy, as unnecessary, I require a deeper, more intrinsic, and more mysterious unity than that with which most critics are satisfied."

Further considerations of the canon of pleasure, play, and the characteristic will lead to a constructive definition of democratic criticism.

The test of good art in a democracy must be its capacity to satisfy some universal requirement in human nature. Democratic art is to conquer in the plane of the common and general. What, then, is the paramount human wish, the realization of which brings happiness, the denial of which causes despair? I recall a drawing by William Blake, entitled "I Want," which represents a man standing at the foot of a ladder that reaches from the earth to the moon, up which he longs to climb. Is it the moon we all want? anything so far distant? Is it not something nearer at hand, as near as hand and feet, life itself? I do not mean that we all seek to escape death, but that we yearn here and now for full abounding energized being. As the poet says:

'Tis life, whereof our nerves are scant,
O life, not death, for which we pant;
More life, and fuller, that I want.

We want the fulfillment of the promise of every faculty. We want the greatest possible health of body, activity of mind, glow of emotions, play of imagination, force of will, vitality of character. We want the thousand possible streams of thought and will impulse set freely flowing within us. Whence comes the satisfaction of the want we all know to be universal? Where but from the source and fount of life, from art in which life has abundantly entered—life conceived after the heart's desire, life made not to the end of good taste alone, or of knowledge alone, but involving the whole of nature to the end of universal progress? Said Goethe in the midst of the waste and bewilderment of his time: "Art still has truth; take refuge there." Art in its entirety is the expression of man's being in its entirety.

A perfect response to art requires the activity in the observer of those faculties of being to which the artist has made his appeal. He who is unwilling or incapable of yielding the sympathetic response fails in his interpretation just to the extent of his denial. The best student of art is

the one who is alive at most points, who can accept the challenge of the artist to the contest of thought and feeling, who in his own being is as active as the artist himself.

Before venturing upon a constructive definition we may inquire what is wanting in the methods of "good taste" and of scientific interpretation, when considered from the point of view of life's freedom and power and pleasure in play.

The criticism of taste is manifestly inadequate to our modern democratic needs. It was a method that came into vogue during periods of aristocracy, when men were more concerned about the manner of their speech and dress than the matter of their thought and character. It is a method essentially narrow, exclusive, the special instrument of a literary *coterie* and professional class. It is not, and cannot ever be, universal. Democracy calls less for the fine phrase, the selected gracious ornament, more for the large view, the inner character, the grand personality that betokens universal life itself. The criticism of taste has, however, one important feature: it contains ideas of the best, it has standards of the right. Even a democracy wants to know the best things thought and said in the world. The criticism that does not give rank to works of art fails in its important mission. When art comes to the judgment of the people, upon what grounds will rank be given? On the ground of the "grand manner?" or on the ground of the "grand" personality? Evidently works of art will be adjusted according to their capacity to satisfy and develop personality. One of the wisest utterances ever made in criticism is the dictum of Wordsworth concerning poetry: "If it contributes to the pleasures of sense, that is one degree; if to the higher pleasures, its rank rises as the whole personality of the reader is called into action." Such a standard is inner and not outer. Then books that read well in parlors will pass with difficulty in the open air, in streets and workshops. With the standard of "good taste" a democracy has little to do.

The scientific process has the advantage of being more universal. At least it is dependent only upon ability to handle the method, and not upon culture or refinement. It may

be employed by any one who has intelligence; it has been used by those who have only patience and industry. The objection to induction is that in remaining objective scientific criticism omits from its results fully one-half, often the whole, of the artistic effect, the subjective—that is, the response which the observer in his own creative capacity gives to the call of the artist. Pure induction does not allow for personal absorption or provide for individual associations. It is afraid of enthusiasms. It denies any necessity of vital response. So long as men remain moral and sentient, there can be no disinterested endeavor to find the truth of art. In scientific criticism an attitude too exclusively intellectual is taken toward that which is a product of the whole man as a thinking, emotional, imaginative, and moral being: “Love, hope, fear, faith,” says Browning, “make humanity.” It is as Edward Carpenter said to the moon:

I know very well that when the astronomers look at you through
their telescopes they see only an aged and wrinkled body;
But though they measure your wrinkles never so carefully, they do
not see you personal and close,
As you disclosed yourself among the chimney tops each night to the
eyes of a child,
When you thought no one was looking.

Research, it seems, is too analytic; detaching form from idea and idea from form, it destroys the synthesis of reality and life. Science has imperfect standards, weeds and flowers having the same value under its scrutiny. While immeasurably valuable as a means, the scientific understanding of art can never become the end of knowledge. As was finely said by Professor Blackie: “Not from any fingering induction of external details, but from the inspiration of the Almighty, cometh all true understanding in matters of beauty. All high art comes directly from within, and its laws are not to be proved by any external collection of facts but by the emphatic assertion of the divine vitality from which they proceed.”

To close with a definition of criticism from the standpoint of democratic æsthetics it may be asserted (1) the effects of beauty depend upon the presentation of that which stimu-

lates, within the limits of pleasurable action, any or all of the faculties of being, the senses, the intellect, the emotions, the imagination, and the will. (2) Criticism is the statement of an effect, or the wording of the result of the vital contact of a work of art upon an energizing personality.

Democratic criticism includes in its scope both the objective and the subjective. It takes account of the medium in space and time and also of the subjective response. It requires personal absorption. It permits the fullest play of those vital associations which are different in every person. The end of its work is not "good taste," not knowledge, but life and character.

OSCAR LOVELL TRIGGS.

The University of Chicago.